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Recent Cases
CONTRACTS-SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE-HONEST EFFORT
TO COMPLY WITH CONTRACT

Cross v. Robinson1
Plaintiff, a building contractor, contracted to construct a small house for the
defendant. The contract price was $2,950, one-half being paid at the signing of the
contract, with the remainder to be paid on completion of the building. The plaintiff
constructed the house, but the defendant, evidently dissatisfied with the manner in
which the work had been performed, refused to pay the balance of the contract
price. Thereupon the plaintiff removed from the house certain bathroom fixtures,
bathtub, stool and basin, which had an approximate value of $115. Plaintiff was
permitted to recover on the contract, in the trial court, on the basis of substantial
performance. On appeal the defendant assigned as error the refusal of her motion
for a directed verdict, because of the plaintiff's removal of the fixtures. In affirming the holding of the trial court, the Kansas City Court of Appeals purported to
follow the rule of substantial performance declared in an earlier Missouri case,'
which had stated: "The contractor in a building contract need not literally and
precisely perform the contract in order to recover thereon. Slight or trivial defects, imperfections or variations will not bar him of his action on the contract, if
he has made an honest endeavor to comply and has substantially done so." Applying this rule the court said: "We think this act [removal of bathroom fixtures]
falls within the category of trivial or inconsequential failure to perform and would
certainly not defeat plaintiff's right to recover on the contract." The court did not
discuss the requirement of "an honest endeavor to comply." It seems that the
taking out of the bathroom fixtures should have been considered, if an honest effort
to comply with the contract is actually a requirement for a recovery on the basis
of substantial performance in Missouri.
Missouri has few cases dealing with substantial performance,' and as a result
the doctrine is not well defined.' There is no case in point where recovery was denied to a contractor because there was not an honest endeavor to comply. How-

1. 281 S.W. 2d 22 (Mo. App. 1955).
2. Boteler v. Roy, 40 Mo. App. 234 (1890).
3. See Fred Bauer Engineering & Construction Co. v. Arctic Ice & Storage Co.,
186 Mo. App. 664, 172 S.W. 417 (1915) ; Knost v. Van Hoose, 182 Mo. App. 40, 167
S.W. 596 (1914); Clough v. Stillwell Meat Co., 112 Mo. App. 177, 86 S.W. 580
(1905); Crapson v. Wallace Bros., 81 Mo. App. 680 (1899); Line v. Mason, 67 Mo.
App. 279 (1896) ; Boteler v. Roy, supra.
4. For definitions of what constitutes substantial performance see: Mitchell
v. Caplinger, 97 Ark. 278, 133 S.W. 1032 (1911) ; Littell v. Webster County, 152
Iowa 206, 131 N.W. 691 (1911) ; Depuy v. Shilling, 27 S.W. 2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930); White v. Mitchell, 123 Wash. 630, 213 Pac. 10 (1923); Foeller v. Heintz,
137 Wis. 169, 118 N.W. 543, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 327 (1908).
(169)
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ever, in other jurisdictions wilful or intentional deviations are considered such bad
faith that recovery for substantial performance is denied.'
The view taken by a court of the duties and obligations imposed by the contract is important in determining the significance of the requirement for good faith
performance. Under one view literal compliance is considered the essence of the
contract, which means that a party never fulfills his obligations completely by less
than full performance, even though the requirements may be relaxed to the extent
of permitting a recovery for substantial performance.' The other view regards
substantial performance as the essence of the contract, the same as if it was full
performance, although a deduction is made from the contract price for the deficiency in the work performed."
The courts use different standards to determine what constitutes bad faith.
In some cases an objective standard is used, in others a subjective standard. The
objective standard looks to see if the variation was wilful or intentional; if so, bad
faith is implied.' The subjective standard looks to the reason why, and considers
the motive for making the deviation. If the motive was to serve the best interest
of the owner, a contractor would be considered to have been in good faith,' but in
bad faith if it was to make a gain for himself.
Basically the good faith requirement is just to assure that a contractor has
retained his incentive, and has tried to perform properly. This can be obtained by
either standard, depending upon the view taken of the duties and obligations imposed by the contract. The feeling seems to be that if a person, by his own free
choice and volition, chooses not to comply with the contract he is not entitled to any

5. Heinse v. Howard, 153 Md. 380, 138 At. 255 (1927) ; Le Bel v. McCoy, 314
Mass. 206, 49 N.E. 2d 888 (1943) ; Andre v. Maguire, 305 Mass. 515, 26 N.E. 2d
347 (1940); Ylijarvi v. Brockphaler, 213 Minn. 385, 7 N.W. 2d 314 (1942); Typhoon Air Conditioning Co. v. Fried, 147 Pa. Super. 605, 24 A.2d 926 (1942);
Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co. v. Tantham, 210 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
6. "The courts never say that one who makes a contract fills the measure of
his duty by less than full performance. They do say, however, that an omission,
both trivial and innocent, will sometimes be atoned for by allowance of the resulting damages, and will not always be a breach of a condition followed by a forfeiture." Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889, 23 A.L.R. 1429
(1921). "[Proprietor] is entitled, in strict right, to just what he contracted for
and in the form agreed upon." Manning v. School Dist. No. 6 of Ft. Atkinson, 124
Wis. 84, 102 N.W. 356, 364 (1905).
7. Atkinson v. Jackson Bros., 270 S.W. 848, 38 A.L.R. 1377 (Tex. Com. App.
1925) (Substantial performance regarded as full performance of building contracts).
8. Smedley v. Walden, 246 Mass. 393, 141 N.E. 281 (1923).
9. For such a deviation many courts have refused to find bad faith. Stewart
v. Breckenridge, 69 Colo. 108, 169 Pac. 543 (1917); Cassinelli v. Stacy, 238 Ky.
827, 38 S.W.2d 980 (1931); Morello v. Levakis, 293 Mass. 450, 200 N.E. 271
(1936); Zarthar v. Saliba, 282 Mass. 558, 185 N.E. 367 (1933); Holt v. Sims, 94
Minn. 157, 102 N.W. 386 (1905).
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compensation,'0 but he may recover when his performance has been in good faith,
for then he would be without fault. If the literal compliance view were taken, use
of the objective standard would be more consistent with the theory of recovery, for
any wilful or intentional variation would be serious. However, if substantial performance were considered the essence of the contract, application of the subjective
standard would be most proper, as strict adherence to a good faith requirement
would be inconsistent, as all the parties contracted for was an approximation to
what was called for in the contract to start with.
Probably the proper application of the good faith requirement would be to
deny recovery where the contractor has not attempted to perform properly," where
he has attempted to gain at the expense of the owner by the substitution of inferior
materials, 2 where he has neglected to remedy obvious defects that could not be
easily overlooked, or where actual dishonesty is shown.'
This would be bad
faith under the subjective test, under either view of the duties and obligations imposed by the contract.
To avoid a forfeiture of the contractor's labor and materials is the primary
reason for permitting a recovery for substantial performance.
If a quantum
meruit recovery were allowed, there would be less necessity for permitting a contract recovery, although quantum meruit may not include the contractor's expected
profits.'
Quantum meruit has been recommended as the recovery when there is
less than full performance.
In many jurisdictions a wilful default by the contractor will prevent recovery on a quantum meruit basis,'8 so there could be real
hardship imposed by rigidly enforcing the good faith requirement. Missouri does
not follow this view.' 9 Quantum meruit would then protect the contractor in Missouri. Thus there is no need to relax the requirements for a contractual substantial performance recovery in Missouri.
If an honest endeavor to comply is required for contractual substantial performance recovery in Missouri, it is difficult to see how the plaintiff's action, in

10. "The wilful transgressor must accept the penalty of his transgression.
For him there is no occasion to mitigate the rigors of implied conditions." Jacob
& Youngs v. Kent, supra. "If the judgment can be said to be a hardship on plaintiff in error it is quite evident that it brought it upon itself." Arteraft Re Roofing
Co. v. Williams, 264 Ill. App. 477 (1932).
11. Heinse v. Howard, 153 Md. 380, 138 Atl. 255 (1927).
12. Golwitzer v. Hummel, 201 Iowa 751, 206 N.W. 254 (1925).
13. Hanley v. Walker, 79 Mich. 607, 45 N.W. 57, 8 L.R.A. 207 (1890).
14. Elliott v. Caldwell, 43 Minn. 357, 45 N.W. 845, 9 L.R.A. 52 (1890).
15. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 805 (Rev. Ed. 1936).
16. Yeats v. Ballentine, 56 Mo. 530 (1874) (reasonable value of labor and materials not exceeding contract price less damages for breach).
17. Wolff, Substantial Performance of Contracts in New York, 16 CORN. L.Q.
180 (1931).
18. Accord, RESTATE1NT, CONTRACTS § 357 (1932).
19. RMSTATEMONT, CONTRACTS, Mo. ANNOr. § 357 (1933).
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this case, can be supported. His act might be considered honest, but it could not
be considered as an honest effort to comply with the contract under either standard
of good faith. Removing the fixtures was not a benefit to the defendant, but would
seem to be an attempt to benefit himself. Justly, by such action, it should be held
that he gave up his right to recover on the contract, because of his bad faith, for
at the time he removed the fixtures he disregarded it altogether.
In the past where there was substitution of something different than what was
called for in the contract, or when the work was defective, the owner was permitted
the cost of doing the work over as it should have been done according to the contract.2 Substantial performance was not invoked, but the courts recognized that
a person was entitled to receive what he contracted for. On this basis alone this
defendant should have been permitted the cost of installing other fixtures according
to the contract. The decision in this case is not in accord with the long favored
policy of protecting obligations imposed by contract.
L. D. Estep

CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER UNDER FELONY-MURDER RULE
Commonwealth v. Thomas1
Defendant Henry Thomas, Jr., and another man, Henry Jackson, Jr., robbed
the grocery store of Frederick Cecchini in Philadelphia. Jackson displayed a revolver and defendant took money from the cash register. The two robbers then
ran from the grocery store; defendant ran east after leaving the store and Jackson
ran west. Cecchini obtained his pistol or revolver' from under the counter, chased
Jackson, one of the robbers, and killed him in an exchange of gunfire. Defendant
was indicted for murdering Jackson in the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Philadelphia County. A judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer to the evidence
was entered, and the commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a four to three decision, reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial.
The majority of the court held that the killing of Jackson by Cecchini was
chargeable to Thomas under the familiar felony-murder rule. Thomas apparently
did not have a weapon; at least, he did not show or use it (the opinion does not
mention his being armed, at any rate). The Pennsylvania law, Penal Code of

20. Walter v. Huggins, 164 Mo. App. 69, 148 S.W. 148 (1912); Spink v.
Mueller, 77 Mo. App. 85 (1898).
1. 117 A.2d 204 (Pa. 1955).
2. The court divided five to two on this admittedly insignificant fact. Justice
Jones, with whom Justice Chidsey concurred in dissent, referred to a "revolver".
The majority opinion refers to a "pistol". There was a four to three split in the
court's decision on the law.
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1939, P.L. 872, 18 P.S. § 4701 provides: "All murder ...
which shall be committed in the perpetration of . . . any . . . robbery . . . shall be murder in the
first degree." (Emphasis supplied.) Commission of felony-murder in Pennsylvania
is a common law offense.' The Pennsylvania statute last referred to merely classifies or categorizes the various types of murder into degrees.' At common law the
felony-murder rule came into play when an individual killed another while committing, or attempting to commit, a felony.' Murder at common law required two
things: 1. An unlawful killing of a human being by the accused; and 2. Malice
aforethought, express or implied.' The court in the principal case defines malice
as ".... a malignant state of mind-a mind filled with a wicked malevolent intent
to commit . . . a felony which according to the experience of mankind, will naturally and likely result in the killing of some person."' Malice has been defined in
Missouri to mean " '...
a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or
excuse.'

"I

The Pennsylvania case under scrutiny here holds, in effect, that the robbery
supplies the malice necessary for the killing of Jackson to be deemed murder, and
that the killing is chargeable to the defendant because his act of robbery was the
proximate cause of the death of Jackson. Is this sound? Legally and logically, yes.
It is foreseeable that a robbery will invite resistance on the part of the one robbed,
a law officer, passerby, etc.9 It is also foreseeable that the person robbed will intervene, defend himself and that this defense will result in the death of one or more
of the robbers."0 Two arguments can be perceived to subvert these principles-

3. Cf. Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.010 (1949), which refers to a "homicide" (not
murder) while a felony is being perpetrated. See Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381
Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955), at page 470 and cases cited by the concurring
opinion of Justice Bell in the principal case at page 209.
4. Supra, note 1 at pages 204, 209.
5. Blackstone wrote: "... if one intends to do another felony, and designedly
kills a man, this is also murder." 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 200-201 (1822). Note that Blackstone referred to the felon himself
killing another. See also MILLER, HANDBOOK or CRIMINAL LAW 454-460 (1947).
Neither contemplates a situation as in the principal case. Cf. CLARE AND MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES §§ 239 and 248 (5th ed. 1952), where
Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595, 12 A.L.R.2d 183 (1949) is
cited. That case will be discussed later in this note.
6. See CLARK AND MARSHALL, supra, note 5, at § 239.
7. Supra, note 1, p. 207.
8. State v. Schoenwald, 31 Mo. 147, 157 (1860) ; State v. Kinder, 184 Mo. 276,
83 S.W. 964, 969 (1904). Malice is evil intent, and not spite or ill-will, as malice
is commonly thought of.
9. See CLARK AND MARSHALL, supra note 5 at § 234 and State v. Frazier, 339
Mo. 966, 98 S.W.2d 707 (1936), where defendant struck a hemophiliac who bled to
death and a conviction of manslaughter was upheld.
10. See CLARK AND MARSHALL, supra,note 5 at §§ 235, 236 and 237. Note that
the authors criticize four cases relied on by Justice Jones in his dissent: Butler v.
People, 125 111. 641, 18 N.E. 338, 1 L.R.A. 211, 8 Am. St. Rep. 423 (1888) ; Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905); Commonwealth v. Campbell,
7 Allen 541, 89 Mass. 451, 83 Am. Dec. 705 (1863); and State v. Oxendine, 187
N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1924). See also 24 COL. LAW REv. 801 which states: "To
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contributory negligence of, and assumption of risk by, the person killed. Contributory negligence of the deceased is not a sufficiently strong argument upon
which to base relief for the defendant.11 Assumption of risk by the deceased (in
"shooting it out" with a captor) is no defense for the other felon because the latter
can foresee that his hoodlum companion will engage in a gun battle rather than
give himself up to a captor.
Where does all this leave us? It leaves us in a position of having the common
law felony-murder rule applied beyond its intended scope by a 1955 common law
decision. This decision is the only one of its kind the court or the writer of this
note could find. Commonwealth w. Almeida, relied heavily upon by the court,
is distinguishable because in that case an innocent party was killed. Commonwealth v. Bolish.'1 is likewise distinguishable, because in that case the death of a
co-arsonist by an accidental fire is traceable to the defendant whether he or his
accomplice set the fire, since the act of one is the act of the other (the accessory
or confederate concept). Also, the Almeida case is based on dictum in the case of
Commonwealth v. Moyer.1 ' The Moyer case dictum is this: "A man or men engaged
in the commission of such a felony as robbery can be convicted of murder in the
first degree if the bullet which causes death was fired not by the felon but by the
intended victim in repelling the aggressions of the felon or felons."'" It is correct,
as the majority opinion states, that the court in the Moyer case had the duty to
decide whether or not it mattered who (the robbers or the owner of the filling
station) fired the shot that killed an innocent employee of the station. But in
deciding this issue the Moyer court did not confine its language as it should have.
The last quotation says "which causes death" but fails to state to whose death
it refers-an innocent person (as it should have) or the death of a felon, as the
Almeida court relies upon. It was a dictum in the sense that it was too generally
and broadly put and not restricted to the precise facts in issue.
The common law felony-murder rule was never meant to cover situations as
present here, and the Pennsylvania court is enlarging and broadening the common
law rule. The felony-murder rule was formulated to furnish the required criminal

hold one person criminally liable for the act of another, it must appear that the
act was committed for the purpose of caryring out a common enterprise". (Emphasis supplied.) This article does not consider a factual situation like the reported case.
11. See Regina v. Longbottom, 3 Cox C.C. 439 (1849), where the contributory
negligence of the deceased was not a defense to a manslaughter conviction.
12. Supra, note 5. In that case an officer of the law while off duty attempted
to apprehend the defendant and his accomplices and was shot and killed either
by one of the robbers or another policeman. The court held that it was immaterial
who fired the shot, that defendant's act was the proximate cause of the policeman's
death and convicted defendant of first degree murder.
13. Supra, note 3.
14. 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947). The court in the reported case denies that
the Moyer case contains a dictum, at p. 210.
15. Id., p. 741. There is more dictum on the same page to the same effect.
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intent for a felonious homicide in the perpetration of some other felony of violence.
It is difficult to see how the robbers' felonious intent can be applied to the killing
of another robber by an innocent victim. The innocent victim has no felonious
intent. The robber charged with first-degree murder certainly had no intent to
kill his accomplice and thereby cause the failure of their scheme.
This case is "judge-made law", as Justice Bell stated in his concurring
opinion at page 211, note 7. Disapproving of this particular "judge-made law", it
is submitted that a conviction for robbery would suffice. Will the Pennsylvania
court convict the wounded robber or his accomplice of attempted murder if the
robber is wounded and not killed?"0 Construing the Pennsylvania statute
properly," the answer should be "no", but a "yes" answer by the court would not
be surprising, considering the present case. The felony-murder fiction could not
be used directly, but perhaps the court will use it as an analogy, in view of the
present decision, to reach another decision beyond the scope of the existing law.
ALLEN S. PAISH

DAMAGES-INSTRUCTION THAT AWARD OF DAMAGES
WOULD BE TAX EXEMPT
Maus v. Chicago & St. Louis Railroad'
A recent decision in the Ohio courts presents a question of increasing importance and interest to lawyers. In an action under the Federal Employer Liability Act2 for personal injuries, the principal issue raised on appeal was whether
or not it was permissible for the jury to be instructed that the award of damages,
if any were allowed, would be tax exempt under the Internal Revenue Code of
1954,' specifically as to awards for future wages.'

16. See People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 265 Pac. 230 (1928) which reaches a
result contrary to the Bolish case and poses some similar questions. See also
People v. Garippo, 292 Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920), reversing a manslaughter
conviction where one robber was killed by another robber or by an unknown person.
17. Penal Code of 1939, P.L. 872, P.S. § 4710: "Whoever administers, or
causes to be administered by another, any poison or other destructive thing or
stabs, cuts or wounds any person.., with intention to commit murder, is guilty
of felony. . . ." "Any person" means any person other than the robber or his
accomplice since the intention to murder is required. There can be no intent to
murder one's self because murder is the killing of another with malice. There will
be no intent to murder the accomplice in the case put. The statute clearly refers
to an act by the "shooter" ("whoever administers, or causes to be administered by
another.. .") or his accomplice.
1.
2.
3.
4.

128 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio App. 1955).
45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.
I.R.C. § 104 (1954).
Another issue frequently presented in cases of this type is whether future
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This problem has arisen in the courts of this country on surprisingly few
occasions. There was precedent for the decision in this case in the Ohio courts,"
and the court said that "to permit an instruction as requested herein, there should
be an inquiry as to the amount allowed for actual loss of wages plus probable
future loss of earnings, for, as to those matters, the injured person, if he had not
been injured and had he continued to work, would have paid income taxes on all
his earnings. ' But the court went on to reach the prevalent result in these cases,
saying further, that "the result of several such inquiries would so complicate the
trial of a personal injury action into an intricate discussion of tax and non-tax
liability, and so confuse the ordinary jury with technical tax questions as to
defeat the purpose of a trial."'
Courts confronted with this problem generally have followed the leading
English case of Billingham v. Hughes' which disaproved such an instruction to
the jury on the ground that the income tax was a matter between the plaintiff and
the taxing authorities in which the defendant, the tortfeasor, had no interest.
The courts following this reasoning have gone on to indicate that the matter of
taxes is too conjectural to be properly considered by the jury in assessing damages.?
It is felt, due to the likelihood of changes in taxes and deductions and the fear of
confusing the jury with this purportedly collateral matter, that it is perhaps
better for the jury not to consider the matter at all. It is on these bases, and the
resulting possibility of benefiting the tortfeasors through a possible reduction in
damages, that the courts have generally been reluctant to permit this practice.
Taking a contrary view is the Missouri case of Dempsey v. Thompson,1 in

wages are to be calculated using net or gross income as a basis. It would seem that
nearly all of the decided cases agree that the damages for future income are to
be determined from the gross income. Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295
(9th Cir. 1949), rehearing 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951), Chicago & N.W. Ry. v.
Curl, 178 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949); Stokes v. U.S., 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944);
O'Donnell v. Great Northern Ry., 109 F. Supp. 590 (D. R.I. 1951).
5. Pfister v. City of Cleveland, 113 N.E.2d 366 (Ohio App. 1953). Smith v.
Penn. R.R., 99 N.E.2d 501 (Ohio App. 1950). In the Pfister case, the court said:
"Perhaps the jury should be so told and instructed to make an allowance in its
general verdict for such item, but the formula for determining such tax element
is so complicated that an instruction with respect to it would be most confusing
to the jury and at best most difficult of ascertainment . . . the tax factor is
ignored by the trial court in charging the jury."
6. 128 N.E.2d 166, at p. 167 (Ohio App. 1955).
7. Ibid.
8. 1 K.B. 643 (1949).
9. Cases following the majority are: Chicago and N.W. Ry. v. Curl, 178
F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949) ; Stokes v. U.S., 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944) ; O'Donnell v.
Great Northern Ry., 109 F. Supp. 590 (D. R.I. 1951); Maregvich v. Chicago and
N.W. Ry., 1 Ill. App.2d 162, 116 N.E.2d 914 (1953) ; Pfister v. City of Cleveland,
113 N.E.2d 366 (Ohio App. 1953); Smith v. Penn. R.R., 99 N.E.2d 501 (Ohio App.
1950); Billingham v. Hughes, 1 K.B. 643 (1949); Blackwood v. Andre, (Scot)
1947 S.C. 333.
10. 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952). See also Hall v. Chicago and N.W.
Ry., 349 Ill. App. 175, 110 N.E.2d 654 (1953) reversed 5 Ill.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77
(1955), and McDaid v. Clyde Navigation Trustees, (Scot) 1946 S.C. 462.
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which the court, though not going as far as is often urged,' did state that "... to
avoid any harm... it would be competent and desirable tb instruct the jury that
an award of damages for personal injury is not subject to Federal and State income taxes."" [emphasis added] The court reasoned that the plaintiff had no
right to receive an enhanced award due to a possible and probable misconception
of tax liability on the part of the jurors. This feeling is based on the idea that
with the impact of taxes being felt by nearly all citizens and the unlikelihood of
juries being aware of any exemption in the Internal Revenue Code, they would
award plaintiff a larger sum than he would be entitled to compensate him. It is
thus felt that to protect the defendant from this possibility, it is desirable to permit
such an instruction as suggested." The Missouri court in the Dempsey case
expressly overruled an earlier Missouri case.
While it would seem that the Dempsey case takes the more desirable position,
it is contrary to that taken by most courts. As was stated in the case of Hall v.
Chicago and N.W. Ry.," a case going further than the Missouri court indicated
they were willing to go: "It is difficult to perceive how the law is distorted by
advising the jury of a simple and concise provision of a statute." It would seem
to be begging the question to refuse cautionary instructions in these cases on
grounds of "conjectural, speculative, prejudicial, or not a concern of the defendant", as the courts holding contrary to the Missouri holding seem to do."As juries
are likely to consider the amount the plaintiff will get to keep in assessing damages,
it would not seem to be unreasonable to permit defense attorneys so to instruct
the jury. Damages are inherently a matter of indefiniteness and approximation,
but when juries are considered capable of assessing damages for pain and suffering
et cetera, it would not seem that consideration of tax liability would be too great
an obstacle to overcome. It should be kept in mind that under the Missouri
decision, the instruction is used to prevent juries from assessing eztra damages to
include possible tax liability.
Perhaps, with increased concern and interest in income taxes in more recent

11. The Missouri court indicated that they would not permit the attorneys
to argue the question of income tax before the jury or examine witnesses thereon,
thereby limiting the defense attorney to the benefit of a cautionary instructon.
12. 363 Mo. 339 at p. 346, 251 S.W.2d 42 at p. 45 (1952). The court suggested
the following instruction would be proper: "You are instructed that any award
made to plaintiff as damages in this case, if any award is made, is not subject
to Federal or State income taxes, and you should not consider such taxes in fixing
the amount of any award made plaintiff, if any you make."
13. See note 12.
14. Hilton v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 177, 227 S.W.2d 675 (1950).
15. 349 Ill.
App. 175 at p. 187, 110 N.E.2d 654 at p. 659 (1953) reversed 5
Ill.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955). Compare the extent to which this court went
with the restrictions indicated in the Dempsey case, note 11 supra.
16. See cases cited in note 9, supra.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1956

9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1956], Art. 4
MISSOURI LAW

EVIEW

[Vol. 21

years, this question will be more fully developed and a more satisfactory solution
will be found."'
ELVIN S. DOUGLAS, JR.

FEDERAL TAXATION-ESTATE TAXATION OF
LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS
Koh ,.United States'
Action by executors of decedent to recover federal estate taxes. Decedent
procured life insurance policies in 1921 and 1922 and paid premiums until December 29, 1940. On January 21, 1941 he made an absolute assignment of the policies
to his children. He paid the gift tax. All subsequent premiums were paid by the
children. He died September 18, 1943. The government assessed an estate tax on
the aliquot part of the proceeds represented by the premiums paid by him. The
statute' provided that the gross estate should include proceeds of life insurance
receivable by other beneficiaries
"... . purchased with premiums, or other consideration, paid directly or
indirectly by the decedent, in proportion that the amount so paid by the
decedent bears to the total premiums paid for the insurance ...."
The court held that the statute was unconstitutional as imposing a direct tax
without apportionment,' that it was retroactive and so arbitrary and capricious as
to be violative of due process of law.

17. This problem may be found noted in 33 B.U.L. REV. 114 (1953); 32 NEB.
L. REv. 491 (1953); 4 SYRACUSe L. REv.350 (1953); 32 Tux. L. Ray. 108 (1953),
commenting on Dempsey v. Thompson, 336 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952), and in
8 Anx. L. REv.174 (1954); 42 GEo. L. J. 149 (1953); 15 OHIO ST.L. J. 81 (1954);
21 U. CHI.L. REv.156 (1953), and 11 WASH. & LEa L. REV.66 (1954), commenting on Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 349 Ill. App. 175. 110 N.E.2d 654 (1953). Also.
an annotation may be found in 9 A.L.R.2d 320 (1950). The case of Combs v.
Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa 1955) is probably
the most recently decided case on this subject. That case presents an excellent
review of most of the cases herein discussed, and though it quoted from the
Dempsey case at length, that court adopted the prevailing view in denying
such instructions. There was little in the opinion to indicate the basis of the
court's reasoning, other than from the extensive quotations of other cases.
1. 226 F.2d 381 (Tth Cir. 1955), efflrming Kohl v. United States, 128 F. Supp.
902 (E.D. Wis. 1954).
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, 26 U.S.C. § 811 (g) (1952), as amended by the
Internal Revenue Act of 1942, § 404, 56 STAT. 944 (1942).
3. Kohl v. United States, supra note 1, at p. 384: "Such construction would
require that the insurance, regardless of its ownership at the time of the decedent's
death, must be included in his gross estate.... A tax imposed on property or the
income therefrom only by reason of its ownership is direct.... Such taxes bear
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Under the 1954 Code' these proceeds would clearly not be taxable unless the
deceased retained "incidents of ownership." But this case reminds us that revenue
statutes must be read contemporaneously.
In discussing the early development of this tax,' it has been said that three
tests were used more or less consistently between 1918 and 1942, a period during
which the statute was virtually unchanged.' They were: 7 1) Did the decedent sign
the application? 2) Did the decedent own the policies at the time of his death?
3) Did the decedent pay the premiums?
The law was drastically changed effective October 22, 1942:8
"... the entire proceeds of life insurance payable to specific beneficiaries are included in the decedent's gross estate: (a) if the decedent
possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership with respect
to such insurance, or (b) if the decedent paid all of the premiums either
directly or indirectly."
This act abolished the $40,000 insurance exemption for estates of decedents

directly upon persons, upon their possession and enjoyment of rights, whereas
indirect taxes are levied upon the happening of an event such as an exchange or
transmission of property.... In the present case no transfer, no transmission of
property rights in and to the policies in question, occurred upon the decedent's
death." See also Paul, Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax, 52 HARV. L.
REv. 1037 (1939).
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042 (2).
5. Schlesinger, Taxes and Insurance:A Suggested Solution to the Uncertain
Cost of Dying, 55 HAnv. L. REV. 226 (1941).
6. Id. at p. 227: "The original (and present) provision includes in the value
of a decedent's gross estate: I... the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable
by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon
his own life.' " See also Note, Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax, 40 COL.
L. REV. 86 (1940) ; Forster, Taxation-FederalEstate Taxation of Life Insurance
-Effect of Treasury Decision 5032 Amending Articles 25 and 27 of the Estate
Tax Regulations, 40 MIcH. L. REv. 1221 (1942); and Murphy, Life InsuranceSlave or Master of Section 811 (g) ?, 7 TAx L. Rnv. 131, 134 (1952).
7. 55 HARv. L. Rzv. 226, at p. 229, cit. supra, note 5. See also Wells, TD
5032 and the Lang Case, 20 TAXES 86 (1942). (The law was apparently settled for
a time by Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1938). TD 5032, Art. 25, para.
2, issued in 1941, says: "Insurance receivable by beneficiaries other than the estate
is considered to have been taken out by the decedent when he paid, directly or
indirectly, all the premiums or other consideration wherewith the insurance was
acquired, whether or not he made the application." Art. 27, para. 2 describes legal
incidents of ownership to include "... . the right of the insured or his estate to its
economic benefits, the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the
policy, to assign it, to revoke an assignment, to pledge it for a loan, or to obtain
from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the policy, etc. The insured
possessed a legal incident of ownership if his death is necessary to terminate his
interest in the insurance, as for example, if the proceeds would become payable
to his estate, or payable as he might direct, should the beneficiary predecease
him.")
8. Menard, Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax, 27 N.C. L. REV. 43,
45 (1948); 7 TAX L. RLv. 131 (1952), cit. supra, note 6 at p. 135 et seq.; and
statute cit. supra note 2.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1956

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1956], Art. 4
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[
[Vol.
21

dying after its effective date. It established the "incidents of ownership" and
"payment of premiums" tests.
By its terms it clearly attempted to tax all insurance on which the decedent
had paid premiums. This court has quite plainly held that attempt to be unconstitutional. The government is apparently resigned to the decision since there
is no mention of it in subsequent Supreme Court Reports.
Its effect is to validate all absolute gifts of life insurance for federal tax
purposes. Apparently the major insurance pitfall remaining for the estate
planner is the doctrine of gifts causa mortis.' The adverse effect of this doctrine
may generally be avoided by making the transfer before the donor has attained an
advanced age or is in failing health.
FRED H. MAUGHMER, JR.

FEDERAL TAXATION-INCOME TAX-DEDUCTIONS-TRAVELING' EXPENSES-TEMPORARY
EMPLOYMENT
Ford v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue'
In this case the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a
decision of the Tax Court 2 denying taxpayers Ford and wife, who filed a joint
return, the right to deduct certain living and travel expenses of Ford for the tax
years 1949 and 1950. Ford, superintendent for the Rust Company, had a home
in Roanoke, Virginia. His employer obtained a contract to construct a sewage
disposal plant and do other work for American Viscose Company at Front Royal,
Virginia, and Ford worked there continuously from December 1948 to early 1951.
During this time his wife and two dependents continued to reside in Roanoke
while he rented lodgings in Front Royal and went home for weekends. Ford
sought to deduct from his tax returns of 1949 and 1950 the sum of $1820 for lodging and meals for each of those years plus automobile expenses of $1127 for 1949
and $1038 for 1950. The Tax Court found that when Ford accepted employment

9. Provides for rebuttable presumption of gift causa mortis for transfers made
within three years of death. Prior to 1950 the period was two years. See Pavenstedy, The Limitation of Transfers in Contemplation of Death by the Revenue
Act of 1950, 49 MICH.L. Rnv. 839 (1951). For some time there has been a tendency
to tax gifts of life insurance as transfers in contemplation of death per se. See
Estate of Aaron, 21 T.C. 377 (1953); Guterman, Transfers of Life Insurance and
the Federal Estate Tax, 48 COL. L. Ray. 37 (1948) ; Hunt, Federal Estate TaxTransfers of Life Insurance in Contemplation of Death, 47 MIcH. L. REV. 811
(1949).
1. 227 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1955).
2. 23 P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. f54,314 (1954).
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with Rust Company, he agreed to go to whatever city he was assigned, that he was
to train a supervisor to take over his duties in the event he should be ordered to
another job, that he had been ordered to various construction jobs from time to
time, and that when he arrived at the American Viscose job in December 1948
he was told that from 12 to 14 months would be required to complete the job.
The circuit court affirmed the decision saying that the expenses failed to meet
the requirements for deduction as traveling expenses incurred in pursuit of a
trade or business' as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Flowers case,' and
in particular the third requirement set out in that decision, which is, "The expense
must be incurred in pursuit of a trade or business". In interpreting this requirement the court said that this means there must be a direct connection between the
expenditure and the carrying on of the trade or business of the taxpayer or his
employer and that such expenditure must be necessary and appropriate to the
development and pursuit of the business or trade.
Where the employment is of an obviously temporary duration the Tax Court
has held the Flowers rule to be inapplicable, although there are no decisions on
this point in the courts of appeal or in the Supreme Court. Thus in the Leach5
case such expenses weie held deductible, the Tax Court following the Schurer'
case although the latter was decided prior to the Flowers decision. In both of
these cases the employment was of a similar nature as in the case under discussion but the Tax Court distinguished them on the facts. Thus it seems that
where only one post of employment is involved, deductibility turns on the fact
question of whether or not such employment is temporary. The Tax Court has
given this doctrine of temporary employment very limited application as is

3. INT. REv. CoDn § 23(a) (1) (1939). This is presently provided for in §
162 (a) (2), I.R.C. of 1954.
4. The court in the Flowers case set out three requirements for deduction
as traveling expenses under this section, saying that if the expense failed to meet
any one of them it would not qualify as a traveling expense. These requirements
were: (1) Reasonable and necessary traveling expenses as that term is generally
understood. (2) incurred while away from home, (3) the expense must be incurred while in pursuit of a trade or business. "This means that there must be
a direct connection between the expenditure and the carrying on of the trade or
business of the taxpayer or his employer. Morever, such an expenditure must be
necessary and appropriate to the development of the business or trade." Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946), noted 32 CoRN.
L. Q. 451 (1947), 44 Mica. L. REv. 882 (1946).
5. Employee on construction company assignments in other cities, such
assignments being both temporary and indefinite and not involving a regular post
of duty. Allowed to deduct cost of lodging only. E.G. and Frankie Leach, 12 T.C.
20 (1949).
6. Journeyman plumber by trade, maintained a home in Pittsburgh and
accepted temporary employment in Indiantown Gap, Pa., Aberdeen, Md., etc. in
each case returning to Pittsburgh upon completion of each assignment. Allowed
deduction for board, bus fare, railroad fare, and lodging. Harry F. Schurer,
3 T.C. 544 (1944).
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illustrated by the Albert,7 Bark,8 and Jones' cases. Since it is a question of fact,
and the Supreme Court held that findings and inferences on a question of fact
should not be disturbed by a reviewing court,"0 this may raise the question in the
mind of the practitioner of the advantages or disadvantages of a jury trial in the
federal district court, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this note.
Aside from this, such a narrow interpretation of what constitutes temporary
employment creates serious hardship on some taxpayers. This is aptly pointed
out by Judge Murdock's dissent in the Jones1" case where he emphasizes that
while the taxpayer was actually employed for 357 days of the tax year at Oak
Ridge, he had no intention to remain there permanently and no expectation or
assurance that the employment would continue for more than a relatively short
period of time, too short to justify moving his home. Thus the taxpayer is faced
with the alternative of either suffering the expense of maintaining a second
home for himself during these periods, or of suffering equal or greater expense
in moving his family to each of these locations for short periods. This hardship
is what Congress apparently intended to relieve when they adopted the section
on traveling expenses in its ,present form in the 1921 Act."

7. Taxpayer employed by War Department in Chemical Welfare division
was appointed for assignment anywhere in New England. She was advised not to
make any commitments such as leases, etc. as she was subject to be moved at any
time. The court said that while her employment lacked permanence, it was
indefinite rather than temporary and was not the sort of employment in which
termination within a short period could be foreseen. Beatrice H. Albert, 13 T.C.
129 (1949).
8. Taxpayer lived in Pittsburgh and went to Philadelphia to a temporary
job for 3 or 4 months. He stayed on for another short job and then for another
job expected to take 12 months or more. The court held that this job had changed
from temporary to indefinite employment and that the Schurer case was not
applicable. Arnold P. Bark, 6 T.C. 851 (1946).
9. Taxpayer was a construction worker who spent relatively short periods
at various jobs doing heavy construction work. Maintained a home in Bakewell,
Tenn. and worked at Oak Ridge, Tenn. He had no idea when he would be moved
but had no intention to stay in Oak Ridge permanently. Also there was no
available housing for his family at Oak Ridge. Willard S. Jones, 13 T.C. 880
(1949).
10. Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
11. Note 9 supra.
12. Internal Revenue Act, § 214(A) (1921). In the discussion of this
section in the House it was referred to as a relief section and discussed in relation
to traveling salesmen and other commercial travelers, since it was thought that
their traveling expenses were a proper deduction and that their meals and lodging
should also be included. 61 CONG. REC. 5201 (1921). However, it does not appear
that the section was intended exclusively for traveling salesmen since there was
discussion to the effect that it might also apply to Congressmen but for the disagreement as to whether you could consider being a congressman as being a
trade or business. 61 CONG. REc. 6672-6673 (1921).
Hence, it would appear that the section was designed to give relief to all
those persons who would be forced to maintain a second home due to the
exigencies of their trade or business. This would seem to include the case of an
employee temporarily away from his post of employment, or one whose post of
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Since each case will depend on its own facts, it is doubtful if any more
definite standard than "temporary" can be devised by legislative means, other
than to clarify intent or prescribe a policy of interpretation, since in any event
it will remain for the court to apply the standard to the facts. However, a more
liberal interpretation by the courts would alleviate the hardship facing these
taxpayers, and still allow the court the discretion it must have to differentiate
between bona fide traveling expenses due to the exigencies of the taxpayer's
business, and increased personal living expenses due to the taxpayer's pattern of
living.
DwIGHT L. LARISoN

FEDERAL TAXATION-INCOME TAX-DEDUCTIONSTRAVELING EXPENSES-TWO OCCUPATIONS OR
BUSINESSES-WHILE AWAY FROM HOME
Chandler v. Commissioner of Interal Revenue'
Petitioner (taxpayer) was employed as high school principal by the city of
Attleboro, Massachusetts, where he lived. He was also employed by Boston University at Boston, 37 miles distant, two evenings a week as instructor. He used
his personal automobile in traveling between the two cities. His duties at Boston
did not require him to be away overnight and on no occasion did he remain overnight in Boston. Taxpayer was not required by either of his employers to incur
any travel expense in connection with his duties and the performance by him of
services as an employee. Neither was he separately reimbursed for the expense
and operation of his automobile. Taxpayer deducted the automobile expenses
incurred as traveling expense from gross income under § 22 (n) (2) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939.2 The Tax Court disallowed the deduction on the
ground that these expenses were not incurred "in connection with the performance
by him (taxpayer) of services as an employee." The Tax Court did not find it
necessary to determine if the expenses were incurred "while away from home."
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the Tax Court and allowed
the deduction.

employment was of a temporary nature, or at a temporary location. Thus, if
the exigencies of the business make it necessary that the taxpayer make such
temporary or short term changes in location and they are of such short duration
that it would be a hardship on him to have to move his home and family each
time, it would seem that the expense of maintaining himself at his temporary
location while maintaining a separate home for his family should be deductible.
1. 226 F.2d 467 (1st Cir. 1955).
2. Sections 22(n) and 23(a)-i (§ 162(a) (2) of 1954 Code) allows trade
and business deductions for employees. The deduction allowed consists of expenses
of travel, meals, and lodging while away from home, paid or incurred by the
taxpayer in connection with the performance of services by him as an employee.
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Two questions seem to be presented in the Chandler case. One deals with
whether the expenses were incurred by taxpayer in connection with the performance by him of services as an employee; the other deals with whether the expenses
were incurred "while away from home." The Tax Court in answering the first
question in the negative did not find it necessary to answer the second. It reasoned
that the employment as a teacher did not carry with it the necessity to travel, comparing the case to the normal commuter situation. The circuit court in refuting the
Tax Court's argument said that the Tax Court seemed to rely upon Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Flowers' for its decision. The circuit court said that the
test set out in the Flowers case was not applicable to the Chandler case due to the
dissimilar factual situations; therefore, the Flowers case was not controlling.
The court, instead, held that this case was analogous to the Sherman case.' The
Tax Court in the Sherman case stressed the point that the taxpayer had, in effect,
a primary and secondary place of employment. The court held that where the taxpayer has two occupations or businesses which require him to spend a substantial amount of time in each of two cities, he is entitled to deduct those travel-

3. 326 U.S. 465 (1946). The Flowers case involved a lawyer (taxpayer)
living in Jackson, Mississippi, but employed in Mobile, Alabama. Taxpayer lived
at Jackson for his own convenience. A condition of the employment was that he
be permitted to live in Jackson, although his office and the employer's home office
were in Mobile. This arrangement made it necessary for taxpayer to travel to
Mobile. Taxpayer still maintained a law office in Jackson, but did little private
work there. Taxpayer deducted as traveling expense the automobile expenses
incurred in making the trips from Jackson to Mobile and the expenditures for
meals and hotel accommodations while in Mobile. In disallowing these deductions
the court set out three conditions that must be met before a traveling expense
deduction may be made under § 23 (a) (1) (A), 326 U.S. 465, 470:
"(1) The expense must be a reasonable and necessary traveling expense....
"(2) The expense must be incurred 'while away from home.'
"(3) The expense must be incurred in pursuit of business. This means there
must be a direct connection between the expenditure and the carrying
on of the trade or business of the taxpayer or of his employer. Moreover, such an expenditure must be necessary or appropriate to the
development and pursuit of the business or trade."
The court found it unnecessary to determine whether the expenses were incurred
"while away from home", since it found that they were not incurred in pursuit of
business, but were merely personal expenses of the taxpayer. (The Flowers case
was not mentioned specifically in the opinion written by the Tax Court in the
Chandler case, although the decision follows it closely.)
For a discussion of the Flowers case in connection with the "away from
home" provision, see 32 CORN. L. Q. 451 (1947) and 44 MIcH. L. REv. 882 (1946).
4. Joseph H. Sherman, Jr., 16 T. C. 332 (1951). In the Sherman case the
taxpayer lived and was employed in Worcester, Massachusetts, but also operated
as sole proprietor a part sales business in New York City. Although he had a
mailing address in New York, he had no office or place of business, and had no
employees. While in New York he stayed at a hotel, generally several days at a
time. The court held that taxpayer's "home" for tax purposes was in Worcester
and could deduct his expenses for travel to and from New York City, for meals
and lodging, while there, and certain expenditures made in carrying on his New
York business under the provision of I.R.C. § 23 (a) (1) (A).
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ing expenses incurred in attendance at the one removed from his residence. The
Internal Revenue Service has acquiesced in the decision of the Sherman case.'
In analyzing the Sherman case, the circuit court in the Chandler case said the
Tax Court in the former case must have found the expenditure to be reasonable
and necessary traveling expenses because of the impossibility of the taxpayer
being in two widely separate business locations simultaneously and without any
necessity that a duty to travel be imposed upon the taxpayer by his employer.'
The court in stating that the reasoning of the Sherman case would apply in the
Chandler case said, at page 469:
"We believe that a taxpayer who is required to travel to get to a place
of secondary employment which is sufficiently removed from his place of
primary employment is just as much within the statutory provision as
as employee who must travel at the behest of his employer."
A further requirement is that the expense must be incurred "while away
from home"." An employee may deduct reasonable traveling expenses (including
the cost of board and lodging) incurred while away from home in the performance of his employment. He may deduct such expenses from gross income and,
in addition, may take the standard deduction. 8 Interpretation of "while away from
home" has been the subject of much debate and uncertainty. The Internal
Revenue Service interprets it to mean "away from home overnight."' The circuit

5. Revenue Ruling 55-604, Oct. 3, 1955. The acquiescence is qualified to the
extent that it substitutes "principal post of duty" for "residence" in the statement to the effect that a taxpayer having two occupations or posts of duty which
require him to spend a substantial amount of time in each of two cities may deduct
his traveling expenses incurred in connection with attendance upon the one removed from his "residence." The substitution would have no effect in the
Chandler case since the residence and principal post of duty were the same. It
would be of considerable importance where they were not the same.
6. For further discussion of the "two business" concept see: Walter F.
Brown, 13 B.T.A. 832 (1928); Joseph W. Powell, 34 B.T.A. 655, 94 F.2d 483
(1st Cir. 1938); Stairwalt, 11 T.C.M. 902 (1952); D.C. Jackling, 9 B.T.A. 312
(1927); Chester D. Greisemer, 10 B.T.A. 386 (1928); Fred Dennett, 7 B.T.A.
1173 (1927); Charles E. Duncan, 17 B.T.A. 1088 (1929); Elmer L. Potter, 18
B.T.A. 549 (1929).
7. Sections 22 (n) and 23 (a) (1) of the 1939 Code or Sections 62 and 162
of the 1954 Code.
8. For 1954 and later years, transportation costs are deductible in determining adjusted gross income in the same manner as traveling expenses, so that
it is immaterial whether such transportation costs were incurred while "away
from home."
9. YouR FEDERAL INCOME TAx (1946 EDrTION), published by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, which states on page 45: "If you pay or incur expenses for
travel, meals, and lodging while away from home on your employer's busniess,
you may deduct them in computing the adjusted gross income on which your
normal tax and surtax are based. However, expenses incurred by an employee
while away on trips to various cities from which he returns to his home at the
end of each day, regardless of the distance travelled, do not qualify as having
been incurred 'while away from home' and, therefore, are not deductible in computing adjusted gross income;... "
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court in the Chandler case felt that this interpretation may have been changed
by the approval of the Sherman case."0 In the Sherman case there was no attempt
to emphasize the "overnight" aspect of the case (though the taxpayer was in fact
away overnight), but instead emphasis was upon the distance involved between
two "widely separated locations". The circuit court in the Chandler case in
reference to requiring the "overnight" test said at page 470:
"If so, the apparently plain meaning of a simple and unambiguous
phrase is transformed thereby from 'while away from home' into something like 'while far away from home overnight.'
"It seems to us that such changes are more in the nature of legislation
than interpretation and accordingly go beyond the rule-making powers
of the Internal Revenue Service."
The circuit court said that it is only necessary that the taxpayer come within
the scope of the Sherman case. In the Sherman case the taxpayer's business and
primary occupation were "widely separated" and he did in fact remain away
overnight, but the court in the Chandler case did not consider that controlling,
saying at page 470:
"In our view, taxpayer Sherman is to be regarded merely as one example
of a man who was 'away from home'; and not as representing the absolute and definitive minimum limit short of which the statutory requirement could not be satisfied as a matter of law.
"We hold that the petitioner Chandler was clearly 'away from home'
in the statutory sense when he traveled to Boston from his tax home in
Attleboro despite the fact that he did not remain in Boston overnight."
The court cited approvingly the Waters case" which said at page 416:"1
" 'Travel . . . while away from home' in its 'plain, ordinary, and
popular' sense means precisely what it says. It means travel while away
from one's home. There is no connotation that the trip must be an overnight one, nor do we think Congress intended such a connotation. Surely
it would be absurd to say that an employee who flies from Boston to

10. Revenue Ruling 55-604, Oct. 3, 1955, Ibid.
11. Kenneth Waters, 12 T.C. 414 (1949). In this case the taxpayer was
employed in 1944 by a chain of grocery stores in Independence, Kansas, where he
resided. He worked on a salary basis, without any reimbursement of expenses.
During 1944, under the orders of employers, he made trips each Sunday from
Independence, Kansas, to Parsons, Kansas, 36 miles away, to confer with them
at their headquarters on business matters, using his own private automobile as a
conveyance and returning home the same day. Court held that taxpayer was
entitled to deduction of expenses incurred in the operation of the automobile,
under the provisions of § 22 (n) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code.
12. In support of the contention that "while away from home" does not
mean "away from home overnight" see: Charles M. Scott v. Kelm, 110 F. Supp.
819 (D. Minn. 1953), which specifically approved the Waters case; 26 RocKy MT.
L. R.v. 101 (1952); Summerour v. Allen, 99 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ga. 1951);
Frank N. Smith, 21 T.C. 991 (1954); Treanor, 10 T.C.M. 336 (1951); Ostern, 14
T.C. 1261 (1950); Irene L. Bell, 13 T.C. 344 (1949).
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Washington on business and returns to Boston the same day is not entitled to the deduction, but that if he takes two days for the whole trip,
he is entitled to the deduction."
It seems, then, that the two business or two occupation concept is clearly
established by the courts, although there has been no United States Supreme Court
decision on the matter. Such a decision is not likely, due to acquiescence by the
Internal Revenue Service. That this is an entirely logical and just interpretation
is indicated by the language of the Sherman case. On the other hand, it is not
so clear that the interpretation of "away from home" is definitely established.
The Chandler case represents the highest court decision on the subject that this
writer was able to find. The Internal Revenue Service has not acquiesced in the
decision; therefore, a United States Supreme Court test is not unlikely. There
seems to be no real reason for using the "overnight" test, except to exclude the
commuter from the deduction. To accomplish that result would not seem to
require such an inflexible guide. It could be based on a reasonable determination
from the particular situation. This would provide flexibility to meet all situations, while still subject to review by the Internal Revenue Service. This would
seem to be a desirable and practical arrangement, but, if not, Congress should
clarify the question.
RAYMOND M. ASHEM

FEDERAL TAXATION-INCOME TAX-PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AS INCOME
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Glenshaw Glass Co.'
Punitive damages gained either through a judgment or a settlement under
anti-trust laws were, in the principal case, held to be taxable income within the
meaning of Section 22 (a) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code.2 The Supreme
Court found a statutory basis for such a decision in the broad language of
Section 22 (a), which refers to ". . . income derived from any source whatever."
The Court in the Glenshaw case asserts previous recognition by courts of a
congressional intent to tax all gains except those specifically excepted and cites
a number of supporting cases.'
By so holding and on the same day affirming on the same basis the lower
court's holding in General American Investors Company v. Commissioner of

1. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
2. 53 STAT. 9, 53 STAT. 574 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 22(a) (1948).
3. Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949); Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87-91
(1934).
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InternalRevenue,' the Supreme Court ended a conflict as to the sources available
for taxable income involving a definition of income set out in Eisner v. Macomber.'
This definition limited to three the sources of income available for taxation.' The
Court in the instant case restricts the definition to its original context, "...
distinguishing gain from capital.. ."' It was primarily used in the Eisner case to
establish such a distinction in regard to a stock dividend, the court holding that
the shareholder realized thereby no taxable gain.
The Supreme Court in the General American Investors case,' decided the
same day, recognizes no ". . . significant difference in the nature of these
receipts . . ."I to the corporation in the anti-trust punitive damage recovery and
the recovery of statutory short swing insiders' profits by a corporate taxpayer.
This ends a series of attempts by courts to distinguish the two as far as being
sources of taxable income.
A logical adherence to the Eisner definition precludes taxation of either
source of gain."0
The Tax Court" in the General American Investors case attempted to distinguish a holding that income recovered by a corporation under Section 16 (6) of
the S.E.C. Act was taxable, from decisions holding punitive damage recoveries
were not taxable under the Eisner definition," by pointing to a provision in that
statute stating ". . . any profit realized shall inure to and be recoverable by
issuer;" and reasoned that since the profits to the "insider" conformed to the
Eisner defined sources they would also be so when recovered by the corporation.
Yet writers1 ' point out that the statutory method of cumputing this recovery is
not the "net profit realized by the insider"'" and that recoveries in both cases are
penalties, there being a difference only of degree.
Once the Eisner limitation upon sources of taxable income is dismissed then
"to say that a recovery for actual damages is taxable1 ' but not the additional

4. 211 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd 348 U.S. 434 (1955).
5. 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920).
6. Note, 101 U. PA. L. Rmv. 1052 (1953).
7. See note 1, supra at page 472.
8. See Note 4 supra.
9. See Note 4 supra, 348 U.S. at 436.
10. The courts would first characterize the receipt as a "windfall" in the
punitive damage cases, then apply the Eisner definition. But cf. Park & Tilford
Distillers Corp. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 941 (U.S. Ct. of Claims 1952)
which held all "windfalls" to be within the meaning of income.
11. 19 T.C. 581 (1952).
12. Note 4 supra.
13. Highland Farms Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 42
B.T.A. 1314 (1940).
14. See Note 6 supra.
15. Ibid.
16. Even under the Eisner Regime courts used an "in lieu of" theory so that
if damages were in lieu of lost profits they were taxable.
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amount extracted as punishment for the same conduct which caused the injury"
"would be an anomaly that could not be justified in the absence of clear congressional intent."' 'I
The Supreme Court finds no specific exemption of punitive damages in the
Tax Code. In the General American Investors Co. case, 8 the Court does not
distinguish the two sources of receipts (that is, a settlement for actual and
punitive damage under the anti-trust laws and recovery by a corporation of
"short swing" insiders' profits), and says at page 479 "as in Glenshaw, the tax
payer realized the money in question free of any restrictions as to use. The payments in controversy were neither capital contributions nor gifts." The Third
Circuit in the Glenshaw case' had stated punitive damages were a gift from the
injured party taken from his pocket by law, in disregard of any lack of voluntary
intent. They had also said they were analagous to a contribution by the sovereign
in the general public interest to an individual, citing Edwards v. Cuba R.R.2"
Yet the payments to a corporation in the latter case were not compulsory and
were on a basis of mileage completed indicating an intent to reimburse for capital
expenditure while the theory in anti-trust recoveries is that the damages before
computing are supposed to fully restore lost capital and profits.
In footnote 8 at page 432 of the Glenshaw decision the court refutes any
theory that rulings holding personal injury recoveries non-taxable because they
correspond to return of capital will support an exemption of punitive damages
following injury to property. This is because damages for personal injury are
defined as compensatory only while punitive damages are in addition to compensatory damages.
JAMES HARRINGTON

PROPERTY-ADVERSE POSSESSION-HOLDING OVER
AFTER EXPIRATION OF "EASEMENT"
Matter of City of New York (Harlem River Drive-Coogan):'
In 1919, when Harriet J. Coogan was owner in fee of the land in question,
the Eighth Avenue Railroad Company condemned it for use as a power plant and
car barn. Under the law then in effect the condemnation gave the railroad com-

17.
18.
19.
20.

Note 1 supra at page 431.
See note 4 supra.
211 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1953).
268 U.S. 628 (1925).

1. 307 N.Y. 447, 121 N.E.2d 414 (1954), noted, 1954 ANNUAL Sui=
AmERICAN LAW 596; 19 ALBANY L. Rxv. 74 (1955).
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pany an easement so long as used for railroad purposes. In 1921 the railroad
company gave a mortgage, purporting to cover the fee, to the Columbia Trust
Company for $280,000. In 1926 the railroad company purported to convey the
fee to Railways Realty Company, its subsidiary, by warranty deed with full
covenants. Railways Realty Company gave the railroad company a purchase
money second mortgage on the fee and leased the premises back to the railroad
company. In May, 1932, the Irving Trust Company, successor to Columbia Trust
Company, assigned the $280,000 first mortgage to the New York Title and Mortgage Company. The latter company was placed in rehabilitation in 1933 and. the
Superintendent of Insurance was subsequently ordered to liquidate it. On May
31, 1935 the raliroad company ceased operations by court order. In June, 1936,
the Superintendent of Insurance entered into possession on an assignment of rents
and profits by Railways Realty Company. The Superintendent subsequently
foreclosed the first mortgage, bought in at the foreclosure sale, and received a
deed.
The City of New York instituted condemnation proceedings in 1952 to acquire
title to the land in question. A dispute as to title arose between the Superintendent
of Insurance and the heirs of Harriet J. Coogan, the original owner. The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's order adjudging the Superintendent of Insurance
owner in fee, two judges dissenting. The majority based the decision on the
ground that when the railroad ceased operations the easement expired by its
own limitation ' and the Coogans were entitled to take possession on that date.
Having failed to do so for the statutory period, they were barred by the adverse
possession of the Superintendent and his predecessors in title.
It appears that the court, without expressly so stating, treated the easement
as being of the same character and effect as a possessory estate on special limitation' and applied law applicable to such an estate. This would seem to be a
proper analogy as the railroad was entitled to exclusive possession of the premises.
At common law an easement is an incorporeal, that is, non-possessory, interest
in land. Under the English decisions a right to exclusive possession is a possessory
estate, not an easement,' and at least one American case adopts the same view

432, 151 N.E. 284 (1926).
2. Branch v. Central Trust Co., 320 Ill.
3. A possessory estate on special limitation is created by the use of words
such as "until", "so long as", followed by the named event. Words providing that
the estate shall revert are sometimes used but are not absolutely necessary. On
happening of the named event the estate automatically reverts to the grantor
without any action being taken on his part. In contrast, the possessory estate
subject to a condition subsequent is created by the use of words such as "but if",
"provided that", followed by the named event, followed by provision that the
grantor may re-enter and terminate. The estate in this case does not automatically revert to the grantor but remains in the grantee until the grantor effects
a re-entry. In the former case the grantor has a possibility of reverter, in the
latter he has a right of entry. RESTATEMENT OP PROPERTY §§ 23, 24, 56, 57 (1935).
4. See Reilly v. Booth, 44 Ch. D. 12 (C.A. 1889) ; I SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS
§ 184 (1936); Fratcher, Legal Servitudes as Devices for Imposing Use Restric-
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5
with respect to railroad rights of way. Although some American decisions and
6
statutes denominate a railroad right of way as an "easement", it is, at least for
most purposes, really a possessory estate. In the case of the possessory estate
on special limitation, it is the happening of the event itself which terminates the
possessory estate, revests title in the owner of the possibility of reverter, and
gives him an immediate right to possession. This also starts the statute of
limitations running and there is no requirement of notice to the holder of the
possibility of reverter that the stipulated event has occurred. This rule has been
held to apply to bar recovery of an interest following a life estate on special
limitation.' Another similar situation in which the rule is applied is where the
grantee in fee of a life tenant holds over after the death of the life tenant.' Any
of these situations would seem to be a proper analogy since in each case the preceding estate expires by its own limitation and the right to possession arises in
the remainderman, reversioner, or holder of the possibility of reverter, at that
time.

In the principal case a dissenting opinion took the position that the Superintendent's possession should not be deemed adverse, on the ground that it was
originally permissive and hence did not become adverse, even after the term
expired, unless actual notice of an adverse claim was brought home to the owner.
Possession begun with permission is presumed to remain permissive until notice
to the contrary is given. This has been held to apply ,as between landlord and
tenant, co-tenants, mortgagee and mortgagor, vendor and purchaser, and trustee
and beneficiary.' A similar rule exists in the acquisition of prescriptive easements
by adverse user."0 On this ground there may be some question as to the propriety
of the decision."'-However, there is some authority to the effect that actual or
express notice is not always required and that constructive notice may be sufficient. This has been held in Missouri where a widow and children held over

tions in Michigan, 2 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 708 (1955); FRATCHER, PERPPLUITIES AND
OTHER RESTRAINTS 395 (1954).

5. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. Ry. v. Peet, 152 Pa. 488, 25 At. 612 (1893).
6. Kansas Central Railway v. Allen, 22 Kan. 285, 31 Am. Rep. 190 (1879);
Chicago & A. R.R. v. Brandau, 81 Mo. App. 1 (1899); 132 A.L.R. 142 (1941).
7. Barnes v. Gunter, 111 Minn. 383, 127 N.W. 398 (1910).
8. A person entering as grantee of a life tenant cannot hold adversely to
remainderman during life of life tenant but immediately upon his death, such
possession, if continued becomes adverse to the remainderman. Ontelaunee
Orchards v. Rothermell, 139 Pa. Super. 44, 11 A.2d 543 (1940); Griffen v. Reynolds, 107 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Barrett v. Stradl, 73 Wis. 385, 41
N.W. 439 (1889). The rule against disputing the title of one's lessor does not
apply to such a remainderman. Christie v. Gage, 71 N.Y. 189 (1877).
9.

3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 15.6, 15.7 (1952).

10. Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.Mex. 497, 71 P.2d 646, 112 A.L.R. 536 (1937).
11. Where original possession is in recogniton of the rightful owner's title,
an assertion of title in the possessor, brought home to the owner is indispensable
to adverse possession. Monnot v. Rudd, 124 N.Y.Supp. 210, 139 App. Div. 651
(1st Dept. 1910); Meighan v. Rohe, 151 N.Y.Supp. 785, 166 App. Div. 175 (1st
Dept. 1915).
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after the death of the husband, the husband's original possession having been
permissive. 2 In so holding, the court stated that if the acts of possession were
sufficient to apprise the people in the community wherein the land was situated
that they were claiming the land as their own, the owner was bound to take notice
of it and no actual or express notice need be proved. The court then qualified this
by saying that there might be cases where the particular facts might require
actual notice but did not indicate what those facts might be. There are also
decisions in Missouri holding that there is no requirement of actual notice in the
case of co-tenants, even though one of them resides in a distant state."
The available reports of the principal case do not give sufficient facts to
determine if it would fall within the doctrine of constructive notice developed by
the Missouri cases shown above. The only facts given are the facts that the conveyance to Railways Realty Company and the mortgages were properly recorded.
The trial court held that such recording was constructive notice to the fee owner.
The court of appeals did not comment on this view in their decision and made no
indication that this was the basis of their decision. If such was the basis, the
decision is doubtful indeed since the almost universal rule is that record of an
instrument is constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers
only and does not affect prior parties.1 To hold otherwise would place a burden
on every landowner to have his title searched periodically. Therefore, it would
appear that the recording would not constitute such notice as is required. Also,
there are no cases which would indicate that the doctrine of constructive notice
is recognized or applied in New York when the original possession is permissive.
In light of this, it would appear that unless the court, in fact, based its decision
on the ground that this easement should be treated as a possessory estate on
special limitation, the decision is, at best, doubtful.
A note on the principal case 5 states that the rule that possession originally
permissive presumptively remains so, has been applied to a determinable fee.
Since the possessory fee simple on special limitation is commonly referred to as
a determinable fee, this would seem to be contrary to the theory advanced in the
preceding portion of this discussion. However, the New York case relied upon
for this statement" involved a possessory fee simple subject to a condition
subsequent, which, while also sometimes referred to as a determinable fee, is
quite a different situation. In that case the court held that when a conveyance

12. Eaton v. Cates, 175 S.W. 950 (Mo. 1915).
13. Misenheimer v. Amos, 221 Mo. 362, 120 S.W. 602 (1909); Dunlap v.
Griffith, 146 Mo. 283, 47 S.W. 917 (1898).
14. Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 85 N.Y. 43, 39 Am. Rep. 621 (1881) ; A landowner
is not compelled to watch the records for conveyance of his own property, Lewis
v. New York & H. R.R.. 162 N.Y. 202, 56 N.E. 540 (1900).
15. 19 ALBANY L. Ruv. 74 (1955).
16. City of New York v. Coney Island Fire Department, 259 App. Div. 286,
18 N.Y.S.2d 923 (2d Dept. 1940), aff'd 285 N.Y. 535, 32 N.E.2d 827 (1941).
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is made upon a condition subsequent, the fee remains in the grantee until the
happening of the event and a re-entry by the grantor, and that the mere happening of the event does not divest the estate. The grantor and his heirs may not
choose to take advantage of the breach, and until they do so, by entry or its
statutory equivalent, there is no forfeiture of the estate. It is obvious then that if
the fee remains in the grantee, his possession can be adverse to no one, hence the
court properly held that there was no real question of adverse possession."
CONCLUSION
If the interest of the railroad was a true easement, that is, an incorporeal or
non-possessory interest, it is difficult to see how the Superintendent, who exercised no more control over the land than did the railroad company, could acquire,
by adverse user, more than a prescriptive easement. It is therefore concluded
that the decision can be justified only on the ground that the easement in question
is analogous to a possessory estate on special limitation. If such analogy cannot
be drawn, then according to the rule in New York requiring actual notice to the
fee owner where the possession or user is originally permissive, the case would
appear to be wrongly decided. If such a case were to arise in Missouri, it is submitted that constructive notice by notoriety of use might well be held sufficient
and no direct or actual notice would be necessary even where the possession was
inceptively permissive.
DWIGHT L. LARISoN

TORTS-AN EXTENSION OF THE RESCUE DOCTRINE?
Hammonds v. Haven'
Plaintiff, while driving home, encountered a tree which had blown down
upon the highway. He knew that defendant would be passing along the same
road soon. Consequently plaintiff and another decided to warn approaching
motorists of the dangerous condition. Shortly afterwards, plaintiff saw a car
approaching 500 or 600 feet away and began waving his arms to stop the car.
The night had been stormy and it was quite dark at the the time of the accident.
Defendant was driving at the rate of 55 to 60 miles per hour and did not see
plaintiff, who was standing about the center of the road waving his arms, until
he was within 50 feet of him. By that time it was too late for the defendant to
avoid hitting him. The recovery of damages by the plaintiff in the trial court

17. In Missouri this result might not obtain since there is authority that the
grantor may lose his right to elect to re-enter by laches, or by waiver. See note,
13 Mo. L. RLT. 76 (1948).
1. 280 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. 1955).
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was affirmed on appeal to the supreme court, which held that under the rescue
doctrine the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence was properly submitted to
the jury.
This type of case is different from the usual "rescue case" in which the
rescuer is injured while trying to rescue a third person who is in need of rescue
as a result of the negligent act of the defendant. The courts are unanimous in
allowing recovery in that type of situation.2
The problem of allowing recovery to a person injured while attempting a
rescue is further complicated when the defendant negligently places himself in a
position necessitating his rescue. Those courts refusing recovery in this type of
situation do so because they are unable to find a legal duty on the part of the defendant to refrain from injurying himself.' However, the defendant in this situation owes a duty not to himself but to a rescuer to refrain from placing himself in
a position which demands his rescue, and the rescuer in most courts is allowed to
recover for injuries received in the course of the attempted rescue.'
However, the principal case does not involve a "rescue" under either of these
situations. There was no negligence whatsoever on the part of the defendant in
causing the dangerous condition. The tree fell on the highway as the result of
a storm. Normally the so-called "rescue doctrine" is applicable only to situations
in which the defendant's tortious act is the cause of the necessity for rescue.
"The rescue doctrine has been held to be applicable only where the situation which
invites rescue is created by the tortious act of defendant or one for whom he is
responsible, and in order to invoke doctrine where defendant is not responsible
for peril to the one sought to be rescued, defendant must be guilty of negligence
toward rescuer after he has begun to attempt the rescue".
The value or function of the "rescue doctrine" is to free the rescuer from the
charge of contributory negligence. The law regards human life so highly that
it will not impute negligence to the rescuer provided his attempt is not made under
such circumstances as to constitute utter recklbssness in the judgment of prudent
persons.' It is immaterial whether the rescuer deliberated before attempting the
rescue or acted spontaneously. "The law does not discriminate between the

2. Rovinski v. Rowe, 131 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1942); Eversole v. Wabash
R.R., 249 Mo. 523, 155 S.W. 419 (1913) ; Donahoe v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry., 83
Mo. 560 (1884) ; Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921) ;
Alford v. Washington, 238 N.C. 694, 78 S.E.2d 915 (1953); 11 Mo. L. Rav. 317
(1946). The cases are annotated in 19 A.L.R. 1 (1921).
3. Saylor v. Parsons, 122 Iowa 679, 96 N.W. 500 (1904).
4. Carney v. Buyea, 271 App. Div. 338, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902 (4th Dep't. 1946);
Brugh v. Bigelow, 310 Mich. 74, 16 N.W.2d 668 (1944); 10 Mo. L. REV. 321
(1945); 12 Mo. L. REv. 471 (1947). See Dodson v. Maddox, 359 'Mo. 742, 223
S.W.2d 434 (1949), noted in 16 Mo. L. REv. 68 (1951).
5. 65 C.3.S. 738, § 124.
6. Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 503 (1871).
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rescuer oblivious of peril and the one who counts the cost. It is enough that the
act, whether impulsive or deliberate, is the child of the occasion.""7
The doctrine is limited by the requirement that the danger must appear
imminent and real, not speculative or imaginary.' The plaintiff in the instant
case knew that the defendant would be using the road in a short time. Taking into
consideration the weather conditions on that night, the probability of danger and
injury to the defendant was quite real and imminent.
Inasmuch as the doctrine is used to relieve the rescuer of the charge of contributory negligence, it should be extended cautiously on the part of the courts
in those instances in which the defendant did not cause the dangerous condition.
However, where the danger to the defendant is real and imminent as in the present
case, there does not seem to be any objection to extending the doctrine to cover
this situation.'
ELE STERNDERG

TORTS-APPLICATION OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR TO
MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS
Barb v. Farmers Insurance Exchange and Farmers Exchange Building, Inc.'
Whether the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is applicable to multiple defendants
was the question in Barb v. Farmers Insurance Exchange and Farmers Exchange
Building, Inc. In that case plaintiff's action was for damages for personal injuries received by falling boxes while walking in a passageway in the basement
of the Insurance Exchange Building. The boxes, which were the property of
Farmers Insurance Exchange (hereinafter referred to as "lessee"), were placed
in the passageway by lessee in violation of its lease agreement. The lease agreement stated that the lessor had "exclusive control" of the passageway, and provided that the passageway should not be obstructed by the lessee. Farmers Exchange Building, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "lessor") was the owner and
lessor of the building. The passageway provided by lessor was to be used by the
public, including the patrons and employees of various tenants. Plaintiff, an em-

7. Wagner v. International Ry., supra; accord: Da Rin v. Casualty Co. of
America, 41 Mont. 175, 108 Pac. 649 (1910); Ridley v. Mobile & Ohio R.R., 114
Tenn. 727, 86 S.W. 606 (1905).
8. Eversole v. Wabash R.R., supra. There may be a trend to relaxation of
this requirement. See Wolfinger v. Shaw, 138 Neb. 229, 292 N.W. 731 (1940);
Guca v. Pittsburgh Ry., 367 Pa. 579, 80 A.2d 779 (1951).
9. For a consideration of the factors determining the quantum of risk which
a rescuer may incur, see RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 472 (1934). The instant case is
also noted in 1955 WASH. U. L. Q. 427.
1. 281 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. 1955).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1956

27

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1956], Art. 4

MISSOURI LAW BEVIETW

[Vol. 21

ployee of one of the tenants, brought this action for personal damages alleging general negligence by both lessee and lessor. The trial court submitted the case to the
jury under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The lessee conceded that the doctrine
was applicable to it, but the lessor excepted to the instructions. On appeal to the
supreme court it was held that the doctrine was applicable to both defendants.
The two basic requirements for the application of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine are: (1) the occurrence resulting in injury was such as does not ordinarily happen if those in charge use due care; and (2) the instrumentalities
causing the injury were in the sole control and management of the defendants.'
The question presented in the instant case is whether sole control and management
can be said to exist in each defendant.'
The lessor contends that it did not have exclusive control nor actual control
of the boxes, therefore, the doctrine cannot apply.' However in a leading case
involving the doctrine, McCloskey v. Koplar,l it was said "that the requirement
that the instrumentality be under the management and control of defendant does
not mean, or is not limited to, actual physical control, but refers to the right of
control at the time the negligence was committed."
The court points out that the meaning of exclusive control does not mean
that there must be only one defendant involved, but that the inference may be
permitted against multiple defendants who share and are in concurrent control of
the instrumentality involved.' That each of the defendants would have a legal right
to control would seem obvious. The lessee would have a legal right to control due
to its ownership of the boxes. The lessor, likewise, would have a legal right to

2. McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 46 S.W.2d 557 (1932).
3. The lessor contended that res ipsa loquitur could not apply because it
did not have superior knowledge. The plaintiff in reply, however, points out that
by the terms of the lease and by the testimony of the superintendent of the
building the lessor exercised control over the passageway and had the right of
control over everything placed therein. The court accepted the plaintiff's contention. The lessor also contended that the doctrine should not be applied since
the plaintiff would then be placed in a more advantageous position than if actually
proved that the boxes had been negligently stacked by the lessee.
4. See State ex rel. and to Use of Brancato v. Trimble, 332 Mo. 318, 18
S.W.2d 4 (1929); Hart v. Emery, Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co.. 233 Mo. App.
312, 118 S.W. 2d 509 (1938) ; Weisbrod v. Katz Drug Co., 223 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. App.
1949) ; 52 COL. L. Rnv. 537 (1952) ; 63 HARV. L. Rnv. 643 (1950).
5. 329 Mo. 527, 46 S.W.2d 557 (1932).
6. See Meny v. Carlson, 6 N.J. 82, 77 A.2d 245, 22 A.L.R.2d 1160 (1950);
Schroeder v. City and County Savings Bank of Albany, 293 N.Y. 370, 57 N.E.2d
57 (1949); Biondini v. Amship Corp., 81 C.A.2d 751, 185 P.2d 94 (1947); Smith
v. Claude Neon Lights, 110 N.J.L. 326, 164 Atl. 423 (1933); Frenkil v. Johnson,
175 Md. 592, 3 A.2d 479 (1939); PRossEn ON ToRTs § 43, p. 299; 65 C.J.S.,
Negligence, § 220 (8) bb, at page 1018. For a discussion of the application of res
ipsa loquitur where only one of the defendants could have breached his duty, see
28 So. CAu7F. L. Rnv. 429 (1955).
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control due to its exclusive right of control of the passageway as provided in
the lease.
It is clear that both defendants owed duties to plaintiff, but their duties are
of a different factual basis. The lessee had a duty to use due care in stacking
and maintaining the stacked boxes. The lessor's control of the passageway imposed a duty to exercise due care in making the premises reasonably safe for
invitees, and in removing obstructions or remedying unsafe conditions in the
passageway of which it knew or should have known.'
Thus it would seem, as the court concludes, that the two defendants "were
in concurrent control in a legal sense and in a factual sense with incidental duties
to plaintiff although their duties were of different factual bases in the circumstances surrounding the occurrence."
RAYMOND AsHEa

TORTS-LIABILITY OF OWNER OF AUTOMOBILE FOR
NEGLIGENCE OF THIEF
Gower v. LambThere was presented in this case a question of first impression in the Missouri courts. The defendant left his car parked on a busy thoroughfare in St.
Louis early one morning, leaving the keys in the ignition. Upon returning a short
time later, he discovered that the car had been stolen. It developed that the car
had collided with the car owned by the plaintiff, the defendant's car having been
driven in a careless manner by the thief. The plaintiff, in seeking damages from
the defendant for negligence, alleging such negligence as being the "direct and
proximate"' cause of the damage to his car, based his action on both statutory and
common law negligence. The court denied recovery under both theories. The
Missouri statute involved' makes it unlawful in cities over 75,000 to leave a car

7. See Duerr v. Consolidated Gas Company, 86 App. Div. 14, 83 N.Y.Supp.
714 (1st Dept. 1903); Kelly v. Laclede Real Estate and Investment Co., 348 Mo.
407, 155 S.W.2d 90 (1941) ; Walsh v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 331 Mo. 118, 52
S.W.2d 839 (1932).
1. 282 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. App. 1955).
2. Id. at p. 868.
3. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 304.150 (1949): "No person shall leave a motor vehicle
unattended on the highway without first stopping the motor and cutting off the
electric current, and no person shall leave a motor vehicle, except a commercial
motor vehicle, unattended on the highway of any city having a population of
more than 75,000 unless the, mechanism, starting device or ignition of such motor
vehicle shall be locked. The failure to lock such motor vehicle shall not be used to
defeat a recovery in any civil action for the theft of such motor vehicle, or the
insurance thereon, or have any other bearing in any civil action."
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unattended with the keys in the ignition. There is further presented, however,
an exclusionary sentence unlike that in most states with similar statutes:
"The failure to lock such motor vehicle shall not mitigate the offense of
stealing the same, nor shall such failure be used to defeat a recovery in
any civil action for the theft of such motor vehicle, or the insurance thereon, or have any other bearing in any civil action." [emphasis added]'
Interpreting this statute, the court denied recovery on the cause of action
based on statutory negligence. The court recognized that in many states with
similar statutes, though without the exclusionary sentence, courts have allowed
recovery under factual situations similar to the one at bar.' However, Missouri's
statute appears to be unique, and the court gave the statute a literal reading.
The court said that the sentence emphasized above clearly made the statute
irrelevant in a civil action. This question was presented in a California cases
where a city ordinance contained similar words. The Missouri court followed the
reasoning of the California case, in denying recovery for negligence based on the
statute. If the statute is to be given a literal interpretation, this woald seem the
logical conclusion.
The court then found it necessary to decide the case based on common law
negligence principles. In this area of the law, there have been several recent
decisions in the several jurisdictions reaching different results.7 The opinion in
the instant case followed the one line of cases which have held that the defendant
owes no duty, absent actual knowledge of the presence of thieves or some other
particular circumstances that might reasonably indicate a foreseeable risk of
harm to the plaintiff.

4. Id.
5. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (App. D.C. 1943), interpreting violation
of an ordinance as negligence per se; Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 1ll.2d 74, 117
N.E.2d 74 (1954), holding question for the jury; Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill. App.
359, 77 N.E.2d 537 (1948), holding defendant liable; but compare Cockrell v.
Sullivan, 344 Ill. App. 620, 101 N.E.2d 878 (1951), holding defendant not liable;
Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d 395 (1952, holding defendant
not liable; Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1948), holding defendant not liable; Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E.2d 330 (1945),
holding defendant not liable; Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272
(1950), holding defendant not liable.
6. Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal.2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954). This was a case
with facts similar to those presented in the principal case, with an ordinance
similar to the Missouri statute.
7. Zuber v. Clarkson Construction Co., 363 Mo. 352, 251 S.W.2d 52 (1952),
defendant was held liable on common law negligence; Schaff v. R.W. Claxton, 144
F.2d 532 (Ct. of App., D.C. 1944), held to be a question for the jury on defendant's
duty; Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So.2d 573 (La. 1951), defendant held not liable;
Curtis v. Jacobson, 142 Me. 351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947), defendant held not liable;
Reti v. Vaniska, 14 N.J. Super. 94, 81 A.2d 377 (1951), defendant held not liable;
Walter v. Bond, 292 N.Y. 574, 54 N.E.2d 691 (1944), holding that the defendant
was not liable on common law negligence principles.
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Many of the decided cases, and perhaps most of them, have been decided on
the question of causation, with little, if any, consideration being given to the
question of the duty.' The court in the instant case quoted with approval the
Missouri case of Zuber u. Clarkson Construction Co.,' which involved a closely
related factual situation: "It seems to us it could be reasonably said the person,
defendant, the owner and responsible for these machines with knowledge that
curious intermeddlers were making the practice of operating the machines, had
reason to anticipate or foresee that other intermeddlers would start the machines
and that, among those who operated the machine some person . . . would be

reckless or unskilled. It is not too much to say that, in the circumstances averred,
a reasonably prudent person should take into account these probabilities, and
would foresee that some injury was likely to ensue.'"
Were the incident one that occurred near a place that the third person's acts
were likely, or reasonably foreseeable, such as near a school, on in an area where
crime prevailed, then a duty might be imposed. In an Indiana case, the court
said that only where "the surrounding circumstances clearly point to both a high
probability of intervening crime, and of like pursuant negligent operation of the
vehicle by the thief" would it be likely to find negligence on the owner of the
vehicle.1 '
If such a factual situation were presented to the court, then the important
question would seem to be one of causation. The intervening acts of the thief,
being foreseeable, would not break the chain of causal relation of the defendant's
negligence and the damage to the plaintiff. The injury to the plaintiff would be the
natural and probable consequences of the negligence of the defendant.
Some of the courts allowing recovery have attempted to distinguish between
those cases where the injury resulted while the thief was in flight and when he
was later "on his own", but later cases would appear to have repudiated this
distinction, or at least indicate that it is a minority view. 2 If such a distinction

8. See 282 S.W.2d 867, at p. 872 where the court said that the "plaintiff
failed to adduce sufficient evidence of negligence or of proximate causation to
make a submissible case." It would seem that any considerations of causation are
unnecessary without a showing of negligence.
9. 363 Mo. 352, 251 S.W.2d 52 (1952), noted 18 Mo. L. REv. 205 (1953). In
this case a tractor earth moving machine was left parked without being "turned
off" in a place that the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, of the
tendency of persons to "meddle" with the machine. In such a case, the court
found a duty that arose to use reasonable care to avoid danger that might result
from the acts of the persons starting the machine.
10. Id. at p. 56.
11. Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d 395 (1952).
12. Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N.E.2d 537 (1948) ; but compare
Cockrell v. Sullivan, 344 Ill. App. 620, 101 N.E.2d 878 (1951); Kiste v. Yellow
Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d 395 (1952); Anderson v. Theisen, 231
Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950).
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were to be followed, it would be a question of causation, needing no determination
unless negligence has first been established.
Absent actual knowledge or circumstances stronger than those presented in
the instant case, there would seem to be no duty owed the plaintiff to remove the
car keys from the ignition, if he cannot reasonably foresee a risk of harm to the
plaintiff. Assuming, however, negligence may be found, there is still the question
of causation which would depend on the particular facts for proper determination,
as the cases cited from other jurisdictions indicate."
ELVIN S. DOUGLAS, JR.

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-THE CARE WHICH A POSSESSOR
OF LAND MUST ACCORD TO A SOCIAL GUEST CONCERNING
DANGEROUS CONDITIONS
Wolfson

. Chelist'

The defendant, in feeding a cat on the evening of August 10, 1951, threw some
hamburger meat onto a concrete landing or stoop by which access was gained
to her home. The cat did not consume all of the hamburger, and a small spot of
grease and food particles remained, blending into the color of the concrete. On
the following day, she invited her sister, plaintiff, to come over so that they might
take a ride and have lunch together. Plaintiff did so upon this invitation and,
as the defendant and the plaintiff were leaving the house, plaintiff slipped on this
spot and fell, sustaining the injuries complained of. A judgment of $2000 was
recovered in a subsequent action against the estate of the defendant, the case
having been submitted to the jury on straight negligence instructions.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals reversed this judgment,' holding that
plaintiff was a social guest, and as such was entitled only to the care due a
gratuitous licensee, who "takes the premises as he finds them, and in the absence
of wanton or wilful acts or active or affirmative negligence.., he cannot recover."
The court further said, by way of dictum, that "failure of the licensor to warn
his guest of a hidden peril highly dangerous to life or limb, such as a trap, pitfall
or dangerous hole would subject him to liability under this rule." Jones, J.,
dissented, stating that he deemed the majority opinion in conflict with the supreme
court's decision in Glaser v. Rothschild,' and the case was transferred to the
Supreme Court of Missouri.

13. A helpful annotation on this problem may be found in 158 A.L.R. 1374
(1945) and 26 A.L.R. 912 (1923). Also see 43 CALIF. L. REV. 140 (1955).
1. 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1956).
2. 278 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. App. 1955).
3. 221 Mo. 180, 120 S.W. 1 (1909).
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The question of a possessor's liability to one upon his premises is one of the
older areas of tort liability' and, due to long established concepts of property
rights, is one which in certain situations still resists the modern law of negligence."
The amount of care which a possessor is required to accord to a social guest today
depends upon the degree of modification that the particular jurisdiction has given
to the governing rules which came into the law in a period which still emphasized
the protection of interests in property.
The Restatement of Torts has adopted a view which classifies persons coming
onto premises into two general catagories: trespassers" and licensees.' This
second class in subdivided into (a) gratuitous licensees' (which includes social
guests), and (b) business visitors.' Concerning dangerous conditions, the social
guest, as a gratuitous licensee, is owed a duty of being warned or having made
safe any condition which the possessor knows and realizes involves unreasonable
risk to him.'0
Notwithstanding the case of Smith 'v. Southwest Missouri Ry., in which
the Missouri Supreme Court seems on first impression to have adopted the view
of the Restatement," Missouri has not followed that view either as to the classification of," or the duty owed to" a person upon the premises by license other
than a business visitor.
The leading Missouri case on the question has been Glaser v. Rothschild,"
where the spreme court seems to have reaffirmed and crystallized the previous
rulings within the jurisdiction. By this case,"' a person coming onto the premises

4. For a survey of this field in Missouri, see McCleary, The Liability of a
Possessor of Land in Missouri to Persons Injured While on the Land, 1 Mo. L.
REv. 45 (1936). See also the Annotations in 25 A.L.R.2d 598 (1952); 92 A.L.R.
1005 (1934) ; 60 A.L.R. 108 (1929) ; 12 A.L.R. 987 (1921).
5. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN ToRTs 163 (1926).
6. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 329 (1934).
7. Id. § 330.
8. Id. § 331.
9. Id. § 332.
10. Id. § 342.
11. 333 Mo. 314, 62 S.W.2d 761 (1933). This was a case involving a boy, the
plaintiff, who was permitted to visit and aid his grandfather in defendant's
station. In showing a friend through the station, plaintiff was severely burned
by defective electrical equipment. The court apparently adopted the RESTATEMENT view of the duty owed to a gratuitous licensee, but indicated that they
viewed plaintiff as coming within a higher classification, an "unpaid employee."
12. Section 329.
13. MissouRi ANNOTATIONS to the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 331 (1936).
14. Ibid, § 342. See also Twine v. Norris Grain Co., 226 S.W.2d 415, 421, 422,
423 (Mo. App. 1950).
15. Supra, note 3.
16. Here, a business visitor (invitee), in following defendant's directions to
a rest room, fell down an unguarded elevator shaft. It was held that he went
beyond his invitation and became a bare licensee to whom no duty was owed concerning dangerous conditions.
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of another is classified into one of three catagories: trespasser, licensee, and
invitee. The trespasser is, of course, one who comes upon the premises under no
authority from the possessor to do so. The licensee is one who comes there with
either the express or implied consent of the possessor. An invitee, on the other
hand, is one whose presence upon the premises is of benefit to the possessor. In
the court's language: "The rule applicable to that change is that a licensee, who
goes upon the premises of another by that other's invitation, and for that other's
purposes, is no longer a bare licensee. He becomes an invitee . ...",1 The court
did not decide whether or not a social guest might confer a benefit upon the
possessor sufficient to bring him within the classification of invitee.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals, in the case of Twine v. Norris Grain Co.,"
held that to be considered an invitee the purpose must be of some real benefit
to the possessor, indicating that it must be a substantial economic benefit. A
number of Missouri cases have also used the term "business visitor" as
synonymous with invitee."' Therefore, it seems clear that a social guest must be
considered a gratuitous licensee, though the point was never previously directly
ruled."'
The court in the Glaser case"1 held that a bare licensee takes the premises as
he finds them barring wantonness, or some form of intentional wrong or active
negligence by the possessor, in contrast to the additional obligation in the case
of an invitee to warn or make safe any unreasonably dangerous condition."

17. 221 Mo. 180, 182, 120 S.W. 1, 3 (1909).
18. Supra, note 14. This case involved a boy who was permitted upon the
premises to catch pigeons, which defendants admitted were a nuisance to their
grain business. The court held that this was not sufficient benefit to make the
boy an invitee, stating: "An invitee (sometimes called a business guest) is one
who enters the premises . . .for some purpose of real benefit or interest to the
possessor or for the mutual benefit of both."
19. Twine v. Norris Grain Co.. supra note 14; Porchey v. Kelling, 353 Mo.
1034, 185 S.W.2d 820 (1945); Stevenson v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 248 Mo.
1216, 159 S.W.2d 260 (1942).
20. Mann v. Pulliam, 127 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. 1939), noted in 4 Mo. L. REV. 470
(1939), where a social guest fell from the front steps of defendant's home
allegedly due to poor lighting. The supreme court disposed of the case on the
basis that no risk of injury could be foreseen and hence there was no duty concerning the condition. There is nothing in the decision which would indicate that
even had there been a foreseeable risk of injury defendant would be held liable.
21. Supra, note 3. In accord is Gilliland v. Bondurant, 232 Mo. 881, 59 S.W.2d
679 (1933).
22. The distinguishing test in Missouri of whether the injury was caused by a
dangerous condition or by active negligence seems to rest in the nature of the
physical object or instrumentality which directly produced the injury. If the
object is stationary it is a dangerous condition; but if it is not so fixed, it may be
an affirmative activity or active negligence. Held to constitute affirmative
activity were: dredging a pond, Henry v. Disbrow Mining Co., 144 Mo. App. 350,
128 S.W. 841 (1910); operating a tramway for hauling logs, Schaffer v. St.
Louis Basket and Box Co., 151 Mo. App. 35, 131 S.W. 936 (1910). Held to bd
dangerous conditions only were: digging and maintaining an open pit on premises

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss2/4

34

1956]

et al.: Recent Cases
RECENT CASES

The decision of the court of appeals in the principal case squarely presented
the question of a possessor's duty to a social guest to the supreme court for the
first time. The court, in affirming the decision of the St. Louis Court of Appeals,
undoubtedly applied the existing Missouri rule as to gratuitous licensees to the
case. The decision by Van Osdol, C., reiterated the existing classifications of
trespasser, licensee and invitee, relying upon the Missouri cases of Prochey v.
Kelling,2 ' and Glaser v.Rothschild,2" and tracing the rule back to the English
cases of Southeote v. Stanley, - and Indermaure v. Dames.2 The opinion clearly
states that a social guest does not confer such "material benefit" as will bring
him within the classification of an invitee and hence a social guest is a licensee
who must accept the premises in the same manner as a member of the host's
family.2 "
In deciding the case, the court distinguished McLaughlin -v.
Marlatt," stating'
was
that that case involved active negligence, and held that Mann V. Pulliamv
decided upon a different basis. In the principal case the court clearly indicated
that the Glaser case remains ruling case law in Missouri.
The modern trend in this area of the law of torts seems to be with the position taken by the Restatement." It does not seem to be an unreasonable burden

used by pedestrians, Porchey v. Kelling, supra note 19; maintaining dangerous
electrical equipment, Twine v. Norris Grain Co., supra note 14.
23. Supra note 19.
24. Supra note 3.
25. 1 H. & N. 247, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (1956). This case involved a licensee
who was injured due to the negligent maintenance of a glass door. Some of the
court's language indicates that the rule concerning the duty owed to a licensee
has its origin in a confusion of the law of torts and contracts: "To render the
defendant liable, the declaration ought to have shown some contract between the
plaintiff and the defendant, which imposed on the latter the obligation of taking
care that the door was secure; ... "
26. Law Rep. 1 C.P. 274, 35 L.J.C.P. 184 (1866), aff'd. Law Rep. 2 C.P. 311,
36 L.J.C.P. 181 (1867), where a workman on defendant's gas furnace who fell
through an unguarded elevator shaft was allowed recovery.
27. The court was quick to point out that the existing classification was not
so inflexible as to preclude exceptions, citing cases as illustrations: Boyer v.
Guidicy Marble, Terrazzo & Tile Co., 246 S.W.2d (Mo. 1952); Ahnefeld v. Wabash
Ry., 212 Mo. 280, 111 S.W. 95 (1908); Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 130 S.W.2d
623 (1939); Wells v.Henry Kuhs Realty Co., 269 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1954).
28. 296 Mo. 656, 246 S.W. 548 (1922), where defendant accidentally shot
plaintiff, thinking him a fox. It was also held in this case that there is an
implied license for neighbors to make social visits in various rural areas. See
note 22, supra.
29. See note 20 supra.
30. In Gudwin v. Gudwin, 14 Conn. Supp. 147 (1946), it was held that a guest
is a licensee to whom the host was under an obligation to remove such conditions
as might reasonably create danger not apparent to the guest, or to warn the
guest against such a condition. In Goldberg v. Straus, 45 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1950),
it was held that the host is liable for injuries caused by natural or artificial conditions on the premises of which he has actual knowledge and which he realized
involved an unreasonable risk to his guest when he fails to exercise reasonable
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upon property rights to require one who has knowledge of a dangerous condition
upon his premises to impart such knowledge to a guest there by his invitation when
he realizes, or should realize, a danger is thereby presented to his guest. It has
even been advocated, and not without merit, that all classification should be
abolished in this field, and the cases dealt with in accord with modern tort
theory, basing the duty upon the magnitude of the risk.8
RAYmOND ROBERTS

care to warn or make safe. In Faber v. Meiler, 278 App. Div. 849, 104 N.Y.S.2d
485 (2nd Dep't 1950), it was held that if the defendant realizes that the condition
involved an unreasonable risk, and he failed to use reasonable care to correct
it or to warn the plaintiff of the condition and risk, the host is liable for injury
caused thereby. In Scheibel v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.2d 453 (1951),
it was held that a social gue-st should fall within a separate classification. "The
duty actually owed is to exercise ordinary care . . .coupled with the duty to warn
the guest of any condition known to the host and which one of ordinary prudence
and foresight in his position would reasonably consider dangerous."
31. Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573 (1942).
Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers,
69 L. Q. REv. 182, 199 (1953): "The limitations inherent in the principles set
out (the distinction between invitees, licensees and trespassers) . . .have today
no necessary relevance to (although they have in fact been allowed to prejudge)
the question: 'How far should an occupier be liable in negligence for injury
suffered by visitors to his property?'." See also Law Reform Committee, Third
Report ("Occupiers' Liability to Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers") (England).
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